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BASIC WATER RIGHTS DOCTRINES AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS FOR RIVER BASIN DEVELOPMENT
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I
INTRODUCTION
In transmitting the report of his Advisory Committee on Water Resources Policy,
the President stated that "the policies we adopt for the development of our water
resources will have a profound effect in the years to come upon our domestic, agri-
cultural and industrial economy."1 The report estimates that the demand for water
in the nation will almost double by 1975 and that there must be a substantial increase
in the beneficial use of water.2 This will require increased development by individuals
and corporations, as well as by public agencies.
The river basin is now generally accepted as the appropriate physiographic unit for
planning and developing water resource utilization. The interrelated and competing
uses of water within a river basin, however, often give rise to varied and complex
problems that appear susceptible of solution only by the integrated action of all in-
terests, public and private, within the basin's natural boundaries3 Thus, while
group development of water resources has always been important, new impetus has
been given to watershed, small project, ground-water basin, multipurpose project, and
river and interriver basin programs, which appear to promise greater efficacy than
development undertaken on an individual basis. State water laws, which have been
framed with reference to individual action in developing water resources in the past,
may not, accordingly, be adequate for the future.
In this connection, several important and troublesome areas have been pointed
out.4 The increasing consumptive use of water in the riparian-doctrine eastern states,
for example, has created an interest in the appropriation doctrine as it might apply
there. The shifting demand for water similarly has raised problems in the appropria-
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tion states. A great expansion in the use of ground water, moreover, has posed prob-
lems that neither doctrine seems to answer. And large-scale multiple-purpose
projects have created novel problems of reshuffling rights of use between users and
uses, between watersheds, and between states.
This article will first briefly review the existing water law-the riparian and
appropriation doctrines; and since most of the adjustment of these two doctrines has
occurred in the western states, attention will necessarily be focused on that area.
Then, it will examine some of the problems arising from the relation of these doc-
trines to river basin development.
II
THE LEGAL CONTEXT
A. Classifications of Water5
Legal distinctions between waters on the surface of the earth and those beneath
the surface and between defined classes of subterranean waters have been drawn since
early times. In the laws of some western states, these distinctions have been abolished,
but in probably the great majority of American jurisdictions, they still persist, and so
it is necessary to take account of them in discussing water rights doctrines.
I. Surface Watercourses
A watercourse consists essentially of a definite natural stream, flowing in a definite
natural channel, and originating from a definite source of supply; and it includes the
underflow.0 The two basic systems of rights to the use of water of watercourses are
related, respectively, to the riparian and the appropriation doctrines.
2. Diffused Surface Waters
Waters that originate from rain and melting snow and that flow vagrantly over the
surface before concentrated in watercourses or before sinking into the ground are
diffused surface waters-often loosely called surface waters. A considerable body of
law has grown up with respect to the avoidance or riddance of such waters; much
less as to rights of use. Generally, the owner of land on which such water occurs is
considered entitled to capture and use it while it is still on his land. There is little
authority, however, as to the relationship between such a right of capture and use and
the right of a riparian landowner or appropriator on a stream into which the diffused
surface water would flow if not intercepted This aspect of river basin development
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may become important as more land is included in managed watersheds, but the legal
principles that will govern it have yet to be formulated.
3. Ground Waters: Definite Underground Streams
A definite underground stream has the essential characteristics of a surface water-
course, except that it is buried in the ground. Necessarily, proof of physical aspects
is difficult. Some courts insist on establishment of all elements with reasonable
certainty; others accept determinations by reasonable inference. Rights to the use of
definite underground streams are governed by the law of watercourses-by the
riparian or the appropriation doctrines, or both of them concurrently 8
4. Ground Waters: Underflow of Surface Streams
Underneath a surface stream, there is usually an underflow or subflow. This
consists of water in the sands, gravels, and other subsoil over which the surface stream
flows, moving in the same direction and in intimate contact with the surface stream.
The boundaries may extend laterally for considerable distances beyond the banks of
the surface channel. From a legal as well as a physical standpoint, the surface stream
and the underflow are not two separate rivers, but are component parts of a single
watercourse.9 Rights to the use of the underflow are governed by the law of water-
courses, therefore, just as are rights in the surface flow; and rights that attach to a
watercourse include rights in its underflow.' °
5. Ground Waters: Percolating Waters
In determining rights of use, percolating water is usually considered to be sub-
surface water that is free to move by gravity and, hence, to enter wells, but not con-
centrated in what the law classifies as a definite underground stream or as underflow
of a surface stream.'1 As in the case of watercourses, rights to the use of percolating
waters fall into the two general groups: rights inherent in contiguous land, and
those based on priority of diversion and use. The former group has several sub-
divisions: the English or common-law rule of absolute ownership, the American rule
of reasonable use, and the doctrine of correlative rights.'2
B. The Basic Doctrines
In discussing more fully the basic doctrines, to which some allusion has already
been made, each of the several principal types of water rights, unless otherwise indi-
cated, will be treated as though it were the only kind of water right in the com-
munity. Later, there will be separately considered the matter of conflicts of water
rights in areas in which rights of opposing kinds are recognized.
i. Nature of the Doctrines
a. Watercourses. Where the riparian doctrine is in effect, the owner of a tract of
a See 2 KINNEY, op. cit. supra note 5, S§I56-6o.
'See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46, 114-15 (1907).
'o See 2 KINNEY, Op. cit. supra note 5, §§116x-63.
" See 2 ,VIEL., op. cit. supra note 5, S io84.
"
2See 2 id., §§ o39-66.
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land contiguous to the channel of a surface stream-called riparian land-has certain
rights in the flow of the stream. He may divert what water he needs for domestic
use. For irrigation and other commercial purposes, each proprietor's use of water
must be reasonable with respect to the requirements of all others. The same principle
applies to the ownership of land that overlies an underground stream or the under-
flow of a surface stream. In each case, by operation of law, the water right arises
out of the contiguity of land and water supply. But a limited use of the water on
nonriparian land may be permitted in some states, particularly if other riparian
owners incur no present or foreseeable damage. 3  This nonriparian use may be
considered an appropriation, or a use without formal right, however, rather than an
exercise of the riparian right.
The appropriation doctrine, on the other hand, gives no preference to use of the
water on land solely because of its contact with the water supply. Under this doc-
trine, the earliest right that attaches to a particular watercourse has preference over
all later rights when the water supply is not enough for them all, whether the land on
which the water is applied is adjacent to the stream or many miles away. This
preference right is known as a priority, and the date on which the right accrues is
the date of priority. 4 Needless to say, the priority of an appropriative right is, in
itself, valuable property. By contrast, the riparian landowner who first begins to
use water gains no preference over other riparian landowners solely because of his
earlier use.
The riparian doctrine is generally followed in the eastern states1 Of the seven-
teen western states, it is recognized, to a greater or lesser degree, in the six states
that extend from North Dakota to Texas on the iooth meridian and in the three
states that border the Pacific Ocean; in the others, it has been completely repudiated.V '
The appropriation doctrine is a part of the water law of each of the seventeen western
states,1 7 and some application of this doctrine is likewise made in the statutes of a few
eastern states.' It follows, therefore, that in some states, the riparian and appropria-
tion doctrines are in effect concurrently.'
b. Percolating ground waters.20 The English rule of absolute ownership allows
the overlying landowner to abstract ground water from his land at any time and in
any quantity, regardless of the effect on the water table in his neighbor's land. Any
recession of the water table, even to the point of exhaustion of the supply, caused
1" See J. R. LoNo, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF IRRIGATION §31 (2d ed. 1916).
"' See, e.g., Hewitt v. Story, 64 Fed. 51o, 514-15 (9th Cir. 1894).
1See Ellis, Some Current and Proposed Water-Rights Legislation in the Eastern States, 41 IOWA
L. REv. 237 (1956).; MCGtNNESS, op. cit. supra note 5.
" See HuTrcmNs, op. cit. supra note 5, at 42-44.
'7 See id. at 74.
" E.g., Miss. CODE ANN. §§5956-oi to 5956-30 (Supp. 1956). See also Ellis, supra note x, at 238.
" Cf. NA, L REsoURcEs PLANNING BOARD, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE WATER LAW, STATE WATER
LAw IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VEST 99-I1 (1943).
0 See particularly 2 WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §§1039-66; z KINNEY, op. ct. supra note 5, §§s185-
211; Thompson and Fiedler, supra note 5; McGuINNESS, op. cit. supra note 5; Hutchins, Trends in the
Statutory Law of Ground Water in the Western States, 34 TEx. L. REv. 158 (1955).
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by the heavy pumping of any overlying owner is damnum absque injuria. In some
jurisdictions, this "absolute" rule is qualified by the requirement that the use of the
percolating water be not malicious and, in some instances, not wasteful.
The American rule of reasonable use recognizes that the landowner has rights
in the water underlying his land, but not unlimited rights. His use of the water
must bear some reasonable relationship to the use of the overlying land. Unreasonable
uses have been held to include export of ground water from the area that results in
impairment of reasonable uses by other overlying landowners and waste of water.
The doctrine of correlative rights has not been clearly distinguished in some
jurisdictions from the rule of reasonable use. In California, where correlative rights
have been most extensively litigated, their basis is reasonable use, with added elements
of coequality of right and apportionment of water in time of shortage.
The English doctrine is followed in some states, both eastern and western. In
many jurisdictions, however, it has been replaced by the American rule of reasonable
use or by the reasonable use rule as expanded to include aspects of correlative rights.
In addition, in a considerable number of western jurisdictions, the appropriative
principle has been applied by statute, court decision, or both to rights to use of
percolating waters.
2. Origin of the Doctrines
a. The riparian doctrine. This doctrine came to America from the Roman law
by several lines of descent. It was introduced into Texas by the Spanish and Mexican
governments, which, in many grants of land, included rights in waters flowing
through or adjacent to the grants. Thus, there was brought to the New World the
riparian philosophy of the Spanish civil law and of the Roman law from which it was
derived; and the policy of granting lands together with rights in adjacent waters was
continued by the sacceeding governments of the Republic and State of Texas until
late in the nineteenth century.2 On the other hand, the supreme courts of Arizona
and New Mexico have declared that in those jurisdictions the riparian doctrine has
never existed 2
Riparian principles of the French civil law, which were also based on the Roman
law, were imported to the Atlantic seaboard by two eminent jurists, Story and Kent,
in the early part of the nineteenth century. 3 After Kent and Story had taken the
riparian doctrine from the French sources, the courts of England adopted it as a part
of their common law, and in so doing, they placed chief reliance on these American
authorities? 4 Thereafter, this doctrine became part of the law of numerous American
jurisdictions by reason of their adopting the common law as the rule of decision in
state and territorial courts.
21 See Davenport, Riparian vs. Appropriative Rights: The Texas Experience, in PROCEEDINGS OF TIlE
WATER LAW CONFERENCES, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 138 (1954); Mann, Riparian Irrigation Rights as
Declared and Enforced by the Courts, and Protected by the Statutes, of Texas, in id. at 169.
2 Clough v. Wing, 2 Ariz. 37', 381, 17 Pac. 453 (888); Snow v. Abalos, 18 N. Mcx. 68x, 693, 140
Pac. 1044 (1914).
"See Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REv. 133 (1919).
24 See id. at 144-47.
BASIC DoGrulM s AND IMPLICATIONS 281
b. The appropriation doctrine. This doctrine has various antecedents, both
ancient and modern. Views as to the origin of the principle in the Southwest conflict.
One is that it had its roots in the civil law of Rome;"' another, that such "appropria-
tions" arose only as a result of grants of water or of local custom based on prescrip-
tionY0 In any event, the principle of exclusive rights in the use of water for lands,
regardless of contiguity to streams, materially influenced the development of water
law in several states in which the Spaniards and Mexicans had made settlements.
At the middle of the nineteenth century, the Mormons, on public lands in Utah,
developed a system of appropriation of their own. By community action, they di-
verted water from streams and applied it to lands in order to produce the food they
needed. When conflicts over the use of inadequate water supplies arose, the Mormons
applied the principle of priority in time of beginning use of the water2
During this period also, gold was discovered in the Sierra foothills of California on
what were then Mexican public lands but which shortly afterward became part of
the public domain of the United States. Miners flocked there from many states and
foreign countries. They improvised local rules and regulations for taking and holding
mining claims and claims to the use of water for working the mines, with the rule of
priority applying to both land and water 8  These customs were strikingly char-
acteristic of those followed by the Germanic miners in the Middle Ages, which later
spread to various European countries and their colonies 9 Possibly the development
of the appropriation doctrine in the California gold fields, instead of being altogether
spontaneous, was influenced by what had transpired in other mining regions of the
world. Nevertheless, the customs so established became statutory law in various states
and territories of the West.
c. Percolating water doctrines. The rule of absolute ownership of percolating
water is usually traced to an English decision rendered in 1843, although at least one
early American decision adopted practically the same general principle 0  The
American rule of reasonable use originated in the eastern states, and out of it grew
the correlative doctrineY'
3. Formal Law
All in all, a considerable body of American law, both statutory and judicial, relates
to water rights. The riparian doctrine of surface water rights and the rules of ground
water rights based on ownership of land, as recognized in the United States, are
composed almost entirely of judicial law. Statutes that purport to affirm the existence
2
r See NAT'L RECLAATION ASS'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PRESERVATION OF INTEGRITY OF
STATE VATER LAWS 165-68 (I943).
20 See Mann, supra note 21, at 172.
27 See I KINNEY, Op. cit. supra note 5, §243.
2 See I WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §§68-71; S. T. HARDING, WATER RiGHiTS FOR IRUGATION 4-5
(1936).
2°See CHARLES H. SHINN, MINING CAMPS, A STUDY IN AMERICAN FRONTIER GOVERNMENT 1r-35
(1948); Colby, The Freedom of the Miner and Its Influence on Water Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE
TO ORRiN KIP McMRRAY 67-84 (1953)-
o See 2 WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §1039.
2 See 2 id. §1041.
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of such rights, when they exist at all, are few and brief. In the West, however, some
constitutional and statutory provisions limit the extent and operation of these rights
or abrogate them completely3 2
The appropriation doctrine, although it is both statutory and judicial, was created
by neither legislation nor court decision. It was first based on custom, which, in the
absence of legislation, the courts recognized as controllingf3 Generally throughout
the West, the earliest statutes essentially codified prevailing local customs, rules,
and regulations that had grown up in the appropriation centers. 4 Later, as develop-
ment progressed and complications ensued, there came the enactment of longer, more
detailed, and more comprehensive statutes, supplemented by hundreds of high court
decisions as well as constitutional provisions.P
C. Property Rights in Water
The water right is real property. The riparian right is said to be not merely
an easement or appurtenance, but part and parcel of the land. The appropriative
right generally becomes an appurtenance to the land in connection with which the
right is completed3 These attachments to land, however, are not necessarily perma-
nent.
Except as noted below, ownership of a water right does not constitute ownership
of the particles or corpus of the water while in the natural source of supply. The
owner's right is to take the water from the natural source and to put it to use. 7
The common-law doctrine of percolating water rights, however, provides an excep-
tion. Its essential feature is exclusive ownership of the water while it is in one's
land3 But this so-called "ownership," as has been noted, is one to which the law
affords no right of protection against depletion by the heavy pumping of a neighbor.
i. Waters and Lands
a. Waters to which rights attach. Waters to which rights of use attach are chiefly
those of natural sources. But a watercourse that was originally constructed artificially,
if subjected to long-continued use and acquiescence by interested persons who have
come to depend on it, may, by reason of these circumstances, be held to have acquired
all the attributes of a natural watercourse and to be subject to all the rights that apply
thereto39 The general rule also is that both riparian and appropriative rights may
attach to navigable as well as nonnavigable waters, but always subject to the public
easement for navigation. '
b. Riparian and overlying lands. The water right that pertains to a tract of
riparian or overlying land arises by operation of law because the surface stream flows
O See NAT'L REmCLAMATION ASS'N, op. cit. supra note 25, at 31-44.
" See, e.g., Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U. S. 453, 457-58 (1879).
* See HARDING, op. cit. supra note 28, at 22.
1 See NAT'L RECL AT ON Ass'N, op. cit. supra note 25, at 31-44.
" See x WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, H550-51, 711; 2 id., §§1o3-o4.
"'See i id., §18. 1"See 2 id., § o39.
" See HUTCHINS, op. ct. supra note 5, at 18.
" Se NAT'L REsOURcEs PLANNING BOARD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 12.
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across it or along its border, or because the waters of a subterranean stream or per-
colating supply move through the particles of its substrata. Physical contact of land
and water is an essential factor. In addition, the weight of authority-at least in the
West-is to the effect that a riparian tract cannot exceed the original grant from the
government nor extend beyond the boundary of the watershed of the stream to which
the tract is contiguous. Moreover, conveyance of any part of the original tract that
does not touch the stream (unless otherwise provided in the deed of conveyance) may
result in the loss of riparian rights with respect to that part.4 There are many ques-
tionable cases, however, owing to the fact that the courts in some states appear not
precisely to have determined what is to be regarded as riparian land.
c. Lands associated with appropriative rights. The appropriative right may be
acquired and utilized in connection with land, whether or not the land is contiguous
to the source of supply. In most western jurisdictions, water may be appropriated
for use outside the watershed in which it naturally flows. This is subject to the
condition that no injury be inflicted thereby upon existing rights in the original
watershed. And in some instances, the watersheds of origin have preferential rights,
even though they are not yet exercised 2 The majority view also is that the appropri-
ator need not be the owner of the land in connection with which he proposes to
appropriate water, but must at least be in lawful possession-such as an entryman on
public land or a lessee of private land 3
2. Methods of Acquiring Water Rights
The riparian right of a proprietor of privately-owned riparian land accrues when
the land title passes to private ownership-when it is first acquired by grant from
the sovereign power or by patent under general land laws. There is no formality in
acquiring the water right other than acquisition of title to the land. Rights to the
use of percolating waters arising out of ownership of overlying land are acquired
in the same way 4
Each of the seventeen western states, however, has a statutory procedure under
which water of watercourses may be appropriated. Of these states, eleven also have
ground-water appropriation statutes. Most of the procedures contemplate applications
to state officials to appropriate water, permits, and licenses or certificates when the
appropriation is complete. With a few exceptions, the statutory procedures are held
or at least considered to be the exclusive means by which an appropriation of water
can be made4
3. Relative Rights of Water Users
a. Rights based on landownership. Where the English doctrine as to percolating
water prevails, each landowner holds an exclusive right that is independent of all
41 See HuTcmNs, op. cit. supra note 5, at 40.
'2See NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING Bo13A, op. cit. supra note 19, at 14-15. See also note 78 infra
and accompanying text.
"See id. at 12.
"See x WiEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §711; 2 id., §1103.
"See Hutchins, supra note 2o, at 170.
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the others. Under the American rule, however, the use of water by each landowner
must bear some reasonable relationship to the use of the overlying land. Export of
the water from the area for commercial purposes or waste of the water to the injury
of others is not a reasonable use; otherwise, the specific criteria governing these
relationships have not been well developed.
Rights of riparian proprietors and of overlying owners based on correlative prin-
ciples are coequal. In time of water shortage, each landowner is entitled to a reason-
able share of the common supply. No proprietor acquires an advantage over others
solely because he uses the water first; so far as they are concerned, he may begin his
reasonable use at pleasure and may suspend his use at any time and resume it at
will.46
b. Appropriative rights. Each appropriator is entitled to the use of whatever
water he needs, up to the limit of the terms of his right, out of whatever surplus
water there may be in the supply above the aggregate quantities necessary to satisfy
all rights prior to his own, before any water may be claimed by appropriators subse-
quent to him in time. This is true regardless of the relative locations of headgates
on the stream.
4 7
4. Quantity of Water
a. Rights based on landownership. These rights normally do not relate to specific
quantities of water. The riparian or correlative overlying owner is entitled to a
reasonable share of the aggregate quantity of water available for the requirements of
all owners at a particular time. In the event of shortage, apportionment of the supply
may be made by court order. Decrees of apportionment take account of the then
existing needs of the landowners, usually on a proportional basis, and remain in effect
as long as the conditions remain substantially the same as at the time of apportion-
ment. But a new or a modified apportionment may be made whenever the condi-
tions justify it. The law has not been clearly developed in such respects in some
riparian states that follow a doctrine of reasonable use, while in some states, certain
elements of the 'natural flow' rule may still apply 8
In California, riparian or correlative proprietors are held to be entitled to all the
water of a particular supply that they can put to reasonable beneficial use on their
lands, but to no more; and appropriators may take the surplus. In case of contro-
versy, the riparian or overlying owners must first prove the quantities of water they
need, whereupon the burden is shifted to the appropriators to prove the existence of
a surplus in the supply to which their rights may attach. Quantitative limitations on
the riparian and overlying rights then become specific 9
b. Appropriative rights. Appropriative rights do relate to specific quantities of
water. The element of priority negatives any obligation on the part of the appropri-
"See id. at 16o-65. See also WELLS A. HUTCHmS, THE CALIFORNIA LAw OF NVATER RiGHTs 436-41,
446-54 (1956).
'
7 See 2 KINNEY, Op. cit. supra note 5, § §782-85.
"See I WI EL, op. dt. supra note 5, §§751-53.
"See HUTcmNs, op. cit. supra note 46, at 226, 441-44.
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ator to share with other appropriators, in proportion to their respective reasonable
needs, a water supply that is not enough to fill their aggregate quantitative require-
ments. But at no time is the appropriator entitled to divert and use more water than
he then needs, even though the quantity he needs may be much less than that to
which his right relates. Whatever part of the water covered by an appropriative
right is not needed is available for other appropriators in the order of their respective
priorities. 0
5. Purpose of Use of Water
a. Beneficial uses. Generally, any use of water that is beneficial may be made
in the exercise of a water right.
b. Preferences in use of water. Riparian uses of water are divided into natural
or ordinary uses, and artificial or extraordinary uses. Natural uses are those necessary
to maintain the lives of occupants of the riparian land; artificial uses are commercial
or business uses, such as irrigation, industrial, and development of power. Preference
is accorded to natural uses in time of water shortage, and to upstream natural uses
over those downsteam. 5'
Notwithstanding the basic feature of priority, the constitutions and statutes of a
few western states provide, in effect, that when the water supply is not enough for
all appropriators, domestic users shall have the first preference and irrigators the
second. In some cases, compensation is required. Regardless of the wording of the
provision, however, no supreme court decision has come to attention in which such a
preference has been enforced as against the holder of a right prior in time without
payment of compensation.
Preferences in acquiring appropriative rights are expressed in some statutes.
Some preferences apply in the granting of permits, such as between conflicting appli-
cations that are pending before the state administrator at the same time; or in im-
posing conditions in a permit, subordinating it to subsequent permits for preferred
uses. The purpose of others is to provide for the condemnation of inferior rights for
superior purposes. And in still other cases, municipalities are granted certain prefer-
ences in appropriating water.5
6. Exercise of Water Rights
a. Handling of water. Water may be diverted at any convenient point on riparian
land. Under some circumstances, it may even be diverted upstream, so long as the
rights of other proprietors are not impaired. The unused portion of diverted water
must be returned to the stream above the lower boundary of the riparian land, or at
least above the diversions of downstream owners. 3 In the case of an appropriator,
however, the point of diversion is an element of his water right; it is there that the
right attaches to the stream.54 And any unused water so diverted must be promptly
returned to the stream 5
°See 2 KINNEY, op. cit. supra note 5, §§782-85. See I WXIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §§740-44.
g' See HUTCMNS, Op. cit. supra note 5, at 337-58. " See i WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §§754-55-
g' See NAT'L RiESOURCES PLANNING BoARD, op. cit. supra note 19, at io.
5 E.g., Natoma Water & Min. Co. v. Hancock, rot Cal. 42, 51-52, 31 Pac. 112 (s892); Fort Lyon
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Methods of diverting, conveying, and using water must be reasonably efficient.
In current water-law philosophies, unnecessary waste of water is within neither the
riparian nor the appropriative right; but in applying the requirement of reasonable
efficiency to the circumstances of a given case, the custom of the country is an im-
portant influence.5'
The riparian or overlying water right may be exercised at any time of the year.
The appropriative right, on the contrary, relates to a specific period. This may be the
entire year, as in some parts of the American Southwest, or it may be for certain
months only. 7
b. Changes in exercise. Water rights of lands based on contiguity to the source
of water supply do not, of themselves, contain limitations on the right of the pro-
prietor to change his points of diversion and return of the water from place to place
within his riparian tract, or to change the place of use from one part of the tract
to another, or to change the purpose of use of the water. Presumably such changes
may be 'made so long as the new use or method of use is within the scope of the
water right.5
In most western states, too, an appropriator may change the location of his point
of diversion, place of use, or purpose of use, provided the rights of others are not
thereby impaired. Some statutes contain procedure by which the change may be
formally made and recorded. In some states however, such changes may be made
only with permisison of the state engineer, after petition and hearing of objections.P0
7. Loss of Water Rights
a. Abandonment. Appropriative rights may be lost by abandonment, when the
intent of the holder to give up his right is accompanied by actual relinquishment.
No time element is involved. When intent and relinquishment concur, abandonment
takes place instantly 0 Riparian and other rights that inhere in ownership of land
and that are part and parcel of the land, on the other hand, are not subject to abandon-
ment. Such rights are not created by use, and in the absence of prescription, they are
not lost by disuse.6'
b. Statutory forfeiture. Statutes of many western states provide that failure to
make use of an appropriative right for a specified period of years results in forfeiture
of the right. Intent is not material; the essential elements are nonuse and lapse of
Canal Co. v. Chew, 33 Colo. 392, 399-40o, 8r Pac. 37 (x9o5); Gunnison Irr. Co. v. Gunnison Highland
Canal Co., 52 Utah 347, 357, 174 Pac. 852 (gi98); Anderson v. Bassman, 140 Fed. 14, 29 (N.D. Cal.
1905) (decree restricting upstream claimants, whether riparian or nonriparian owners, from using water
from the stream where no provision was made for returning the surplus water thereto).
so See Hu-rciiNs, op. cit. supra note 5, at 306-09, 316-2o.
See NAT'L PLANNING REsotmcas BoARID, op. cit. supra note 19, at so.
"8 See I KINNEY, op. cit. supra note 5, 5521-
" See NAT'L PLANNING REsouRcEs BoAtn, op. cit. supra note 19, at 15-16.
'o See I WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §567-69; 2 KINNEY. op. cit. supra note 5, §I5100-05.
" See i WiEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §86i; NAT'L RESOURcrs PLANNING BOA"D, op. cit. supra note
19, at 17.
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time.62 The forfeiture statutes do not, however, apply to riparian and correlative
percolating water rights 3
c. Prescription. Water rights of most types are subject to loss by adverse posses-
sion and use, for the period of time prescribed by the statute of limitation of actions
to recover real property, when accompanied by all the elements necessary to establish
prescription." Losses by prescription have been adjudicated with respect to riparian
rights, correlative rights of overlying landowners, and appropriative rightsP 5
d. Estoppel. Equitable estoppel may occasion the loss of an appropriative rightP6
Under some circumstances, a riparian owner, too, can be estopped from objecting to
an appropriative diversion that deprives him of the use of water to which he would
otherwise be entided.67
e. Other ways of severing riparian rights from land. In California, where cases
of severance of riparian rights from riparian land have been most extensively litigated,
the following principles have been declared:"'
(i) A riparian owner whose land is cut off by avulsion from contiguity to the
stream thereby loses his riparian right, unless he restores the stream to its original
channel within a reasonable time and without trespassing on the lands of others.
(2) In the subdivision of a riparian tract, parcels, lying back from the stream
which are thereby cut off from contact lose their riparian rights, unless the intention
to preserve them is mentioned specifically in the deeds or is necessarily implied by
the circumstances. If the riparian right of a detached parcel is once lost, it can
never be regained, even if the parcel is later united in ownership with lands con-
tiguous to the stream.
(3) In a partition of riparian land, riparian rights are preserved in all of the sub-
divided parcels, whether or not severed from contact with the stream, unless the
decree of partition provides otherwise.
(4) A riparian owner who sells his land may reserve the riparian right by a
clause in the deed of conveyance.
(5) A riparian owner may grant his riparian right to another person who pro-
poses to divert the water to nonriparian land. Such a grant is not made in the exercise
of his riparian right, and it does not transfer the riparian right to nonriparian land.
Its only effect is to waive the right of the grantor to object to the grantee's diversion.
2 See I WIFL, op. cit. supra note 5, §§574-78; 2 KINNEY, op, cit. supra note 5, §§ I 8-2o; HuTcHINs,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 392-97; NA'rL REsouRcES PLANNING BoAiw, op. cit. supra note i9, at 17-18.
" E.g., Tulare Irr. Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist., 3 Cal.ad 489, 530-33, 45 P.ad 972 (935);
Freeland v. Peltier, 44 S.V.ad 404, 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d 9o8,
933-34, 207 P.2d 17 (1949).
'See NA'L RESOURCES PLANNING BoARD, op. cit. supra note i9, at 18-i9. See also Craig, Pre-
scriptive Water Rights in California and the Necessity for a Valid Statutory Appropriation, 42 CALIF.
L. REV. 219 (1954).
" See WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §5579, 863, 3370. See also Pasadena v. Alhambra, 33 Cal.2d qo8,
426-33, 207 P.ad 17 (3949).
00 See I WIEL, op. cit. supra note 5, §5593-95.
07 See HUrTCmHNs, op. cit. supra note 46, at 193-94.
See id. at 189-96.
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The contract is binding on the parties and their successors but not on other riparian
owners who do not consent to the transaction.
(6) The riparian right may be condemned for public use under the laws relating
to eminent domain.
8. Permit Systems
In some eastern states, legislation requires a permit from a state agency to take
water for irrigation or other purposes from a watercourse; and in a few states, from
a ground-water source. It is doubtful whether, in most such states, these permits
create any substantial property rights.09 Although they probably have little effect
on riparian rights, they may provide some administrative restraint upon the exercise
of these rights, and they do provide a record of use that should be extremely useful
in considering water rights legislation and administration in the future.
D. Conflicts and Their Adjustment
i. Riparian and Appropriative Rights70
The conflict between appropriative and riparian rights has been significant only
in the seventeen western states. There, the century-old impasse has been settled in
some jurisdictions, at least so far as basia principles go, but it still persists in others.
Individual conflicts have stemmed principally from the asserted right of the
riparian owner to have the stream flow down to his land. Although the "natural
flow" theory of the common law had been so modified, where irrigation was im-
portant, as to allow each riparian owner to make a reasonable use of the water on his
riparian land, even though the result was to lessen the flow to downstream pro-
prietors, there was nothing in the riparian doctrine that required the latter to submit
to upstream diversions to nonriparian lands. On the same stream, then, there have
been riparian landowners who have claimed that their water rights entitled them to
the full flow of the stream as against nonriparian diversions, whether or not the
riparians had ever used the water or presently intended to do so; and appropriators
who have claimed that priority of diversion and use of water should govern, whether
the use be made on riparian or nonriparian land. Conflicts also have resulted in some
areas from claims by riparians of the right to use water wastefully or to withhold use
without losing the right. And in still others, they have arisen simply from competition
between early and late comers for the use of water supplies not sufficient for all.
Considering the West as a whole, the trend has been toward bringing the opera-
tion of the riparian doctrine-where it is recognized-more into line with standards
of use generally applicable to appropriators. This has been accomplished by sub-
stantially modifying the common-law right for the purpose of reducing or eliminating
its obstructive aspects. At present, a riparian owner has no more license to waste
water than has an appropriator; and the appropriator never has had the right to do
that, although in practice, he may, in many cases, actually have diverted more than
" See Ellis, supra note I5, at 238.
" See generally, Hutchins, History of the Conflict Between Riparian and Appropriative Rights in the
Western States, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE WATER LAW CONFERENCES, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS io6 (1954).
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he put to beneficial use. In a few of the western jurisdictions, however, the interrela-
tionships of riparian and appropriative claimants have not yet been definitely estab-
lished.
a. Nature of adjustments. The riparian-appropriative conflict has effectively
been settled in eight of the seventeen western states by repudiating the riparian doc-
trine in toto. In some of these jurisdictions, the doctrine never had been recognized.
In a few, its status was in question during the early years of water development. And
in one state, the supreme court actually recognized the riparian doctrine for a time
and then repudiated it.
In the dual-system states of the West-the six lying on the iooth meridian and
the three bordering the Pacific Ocean, some portions of which are generally humid
and other portions generally arid or semiarid--conflicts have resulted in retaining the
riparian doctrine but modifying its principles. The extent of modification of the
common-law doctrine and the resulting effectiveness of the appropriative principle
when opposed, in a particular area, by the riparian vary considerably. Some examples
are:
(i) As the result of legislation and court decisions, the riparian doctrine has been
reduced to little more than a legal fiction and to minor importance in the economy
of the state.
(2) The riparian owner must put the water to reasonable use in order to hold it
as against the claim of an appropriator.
(3) The riparian doctrine in its reasonable-use phase is fundamental, but super-
imposed upon it is a system of appropriative rights that relate to the surplus waters
above those to which riparian rights attach. With respect to the full quantities of
water necessary to supply the riparians, their rights are paramount. But equally
paramount to the claims of riparian owners are appropriative rights with respect to the
surplus.
b. Unused riparian rights. A major difficulty in these adjustments is the matter
of unused riparian rights. In as much as in the strict application of the riparian
doctrine the water right is neither gained by use nor lost by disuse, future use stands
as high as present use and is equally entitled to protection of the law against impair-
ment by appropriative diversions. This right reaches into the indefinite future; there
is no time limitation whatsoever.
In jurisdictions in which the courts hold to the sanctity of the unused right,
statutory attempts to provide for their forfeiture have not been tolerated. California
is one of these states. There, in order to preserve the unused right from loss by
adverse use, the riparian owner may obtain a declaratory decree against a person
whose diversion for nonriparian purposes threatens to ripen, if continued, into a pre-
scriptive right. The effect of this declaratory judgment and decree is to enjoin the
adverse party from diverting the water at any time the riparian wishes to use it and
from claiming a right by adverse use as against the latter.
The question of unused riparian rights has been met in some other states
LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
by requiring the riparian owner to begin making beneficial use of the water within
a certain time fixed by statute, or, in the event the water is wanted by an appropri-
ator, either to begin use within a reasonable time or to allow the appropriative right
to take precedence. Whe-her the courts have gone along with legislative attempts
to do this has depended upon the extent to which they considered their former
declarations as to future use stare decisis.
2. Ground Water Rights
2. Correlative overlying and appropriative rights. Conflicts between these rights
have been confined to much smaller areas and to shorter times than have the historic
riparian-appropriative conflicts. In California, where they have had the attention Of
the courts in a considerable number of cases, the interrelationships are the same as
those of riparian and appropriative rights. Basically, the rights of overlying owners
are paramount, and appropriators for nonoverlying uses may take the surplus. And
an overlying owner may have his right of future use protected by obtaining a declara-
tory judgment and decree."'
b. Absolute ownership and appropriative rights. The conflict between a right
of absolute ownership of percolating water and a right of appropriation in a stream
with which the percolating water is physically connected is irreconcilable. There is
no present legal basis for adjusting such conflicting rights so long as the right of an
overlying landowner to the ground water in his land is held to be absolute.
E. Comparative Evaluation
To the extent that water development is carried on by individuals and small
groups, the question of what basic doctrine shall prevail comes to the fore. The
following comparisons are based on western experience with the appropriation and
riparian doctrines. This experience cannot, it should be noted, be carried directly
to eastern problems without extensive study and probably some trial and error.
i. Riparian Doctrine
a. Some advantages. By contrast with the appropriator who holds a junior or
late-season right, the riparian landowner is assured of at least some water whenever
it is available.
In its common-law form, the riparian right is not lost solely by disuse; although
in some western jurisdictions the right must be exercised if the landowner is to hold
it. Where this right of future use is recognized, the riparian right may be safe-
guarded by declaratory decree against loss by prescription on the part of an appro-
priator. This is an obvious advantage from the standpoint of the riparian owner.
From the standpoint of "unfreezing" unused water rights so that the water may be
made available for use, however, it is a material disadvantage.
In the West, the trend is to hold the riparian owner to reasonable use as against
an appropriator as well as against other riparian proprietors.
Although the right of a riparian owner encompasses the use of the water only
"' See HuTCHINS, Op. cit. stLpra note 46, at 441-46, 454-59, 493-94, 498, 500.
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on his riparian land, he can purportedly sell his riparian right to a nonriparian owner,
the effect of which (in California) is simply to estop him from objecting to the
latter's diversion.
The riparian doctrine is better suited to a situation in which the demand for the
water does not exceed the supply and large investments are not required to develop
water supplies.
b. Some disadvantages. Where the right of future use is recognized, the unused
riparian right can be held indefinitely without forfeiture, which means that riparian
owners who have been making use of the water may have to forego some of their
accustomed use when the previous nonusers elect to demand their shares.
The riparian doctrine tends to "freeze" a variable quantity of water to a specific
tract of land. By contract, however, at least in California, the riparian owner can
ostensibly sell his riparian right to a nonriparian and thus estop himself from object-
ing to the latter's diversion.
In its common-law form, the riparian right contemplated forebay storage only.
In California and Washington, the courts have held that the riparian right does not
cover seasonal storage of water; such storage may be accomplished only under appro-
priative rights.
Originally in California, where most of the disputes between riparian owners and
appropriators have been litigated, the courts held that the riparian owner was not
limited to any measure of reasonableness as against an appropriator. Now, as a
result of a constitutional amendment and its favorable interpretation by the supreme
court of the state, the riparian is limited to reasonableness as against appropriators
as well as against other riparians.
The contribution of the riparian doctrine to the building of western agriculture
has been much less than that of the appropriation doctrine. The riparian doctrine
apparently was satisfactory in eastern states until recent demands for water raised
questions of adequate supplies.
2. Appropriation Doctrine
a. Some advantages. This doctrine assures the holder of the water right of his
full appropriative supply of water, in order of priority, whenever the water is avail-
able. Hence, early priorities have reasonable assurance of a water supply each year.
Thus, it enables development to be predicated on a reasonably assured water supply.
Much of this advantage would be lost if water could be appropriated for only a period
of years, not in perpetuity, in an area in which irrigation is necessary to agriculture.
Although in early days there were rendered some excessive decrees that still give
trouble, the appropriation doctrine always has been limited, in theory, to beneficial
use. It has come to be further limited to economical or reasonable use as against other
appropriators. This does not mean a sharing of the water by senior and junior
appropriators in time of shortage; it means simply that the appropriators shall divert,
convey, and use the water not only without unnecessary waste, but with a high a
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degree of efficiency as is consistent with the general economy and actual practices
of the community.
Appropriation statutes can, and many of them do, provide restrictions on the
right to appropriate water in the interest of the public welfare. Such restrictions
have not yet included criteria based on character of the land; but there is no reason
why the state could not provide that an application to appropriate water shall be
rejected where the land proposed to be irrigated is poor, thus withholding the water
in favor of later applicants for use on better land. The state grants the right to
appropriate water, and it can certainly regulate the method of appropriation. This
would be a proper exercise of its police power.
Water can be appropriated for storage for beneficial use, whether the storage be
temporary or seasonal.
The prevalence of provisions in the western statutes, and approval of the principle
by the courts, for changes in exercise of water rights-point of diversion, place of use,
and purpose of use-where no injury is inflicted on others, allows a considerable
measure of flexibility in the application of this doctrine.
The appropriative right can be lost by abandonment or statutory forfeiture. An
essential feature of the appropriative right is that it is gained by use and may be lost
by disuse.
On the whole, the appropriation doctrine has contributed materially to the agri-
cultural development of the West, where the acreage of good land has exceeded the
quantity of water with which to irrigate it.
b. Some disadiantages. Holders of late priorities probably have little assurance
of water supply in most seasons, and the very late ones have no assurance except in
years of extremely heavy runoff. Under the essential philosophy of the doctrine of
prior appropriation, diversions under later priorities are reduced or cut off entirely
when the supply is less than sufficient to fill the requirements of all those earlier in
point of time.
The appropriation doctrine tends to "freeze" a specific quantity of water to a spe-
cific tract of land. The provisions for transferring the use of the water to other
purposes or to other lands tend to lessen this disadvantage; but there is no provision
in the law, aside from condemnation, for requiring an appropriator to accede to a
change of the place of use of his appropriated water from one tract to another so long
as his right is in good standing. In other words, there is a large measure of in-
flexibility with respect to a continuously-used appropriative right, even though the
water might be put to better use elsewhere.
In areas in which both riparian and appropriative rights are recognized, a riparian
owner may prevent the ripening of a prescriptive right in favor of an appropriator
by obtaining a declaratory decree against him.
3. Summary.
This enumeration of the asserted advantages and disadvantages of the riparian
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and appropriation doctrines, as they influence individual effort in developing water
resources, seems to indicate the need for modification in both doctrines in the future
to meet changing economic conditions. In the eastern states, there is a strong move-
ment toward modification of the riparian doctrine to foster more development of
water resources by individuals and small groups. The purpose is to assure the person
who develops a water supply a reasonable opportunity to recover the benefits from
his efforts. This movement to modify the riparian system might be characterized
as a move toward certain elements of the appropriation doctrine, but it will probably
result in something quite different from the western appropriation doctrine.
Because of the nature of the remaining opportunities in surface water resources,
our greatest future development will come from group enterprises and large-scale
public projects encompassing entire river basins. The relation of the above-oudined
water rights doctrines to such projects will, accordingly, be explored in the next part.
III
IMPLICATIONS FOR Rivr BASIN DEVELOPMENT
A. By Whom Is the Development to Be Made?
The implications of the various water rights doctrines for river basin development
will depend, to some extent, on which agency or agencies participate in the under-
taking. Will the development be made exclusively by federal, state, district, or indi-
vidual effort, or by some combination or combinations of these?
Let us assume, first, that the federal governrment will develop the river basin.
The powers of the federal government are limited to those delegated by the
Constitution. Over the years, these delegated powers have been interpreted by the
Supreme Court and extended by congressional action to provide a significant body of
law and authority for water resources development as to navigation, flood control,
irrigation, power, other public purposes, and related land uses. Under the com-
merce power,72 for example, Congress has jurisdiction over all navigable waters and
nonnavigable tributaries as related to navigable capacity of the navigable waterways.
And not only has the Supreme Court outlined the authority available to carry out
this specific function, but it has also indicated that in the exercise of the commerce
authority, there is no constitutional impediment to Congress in comprehensive de-
velopment of navigable rivers and their watersheds."
It is for Congress alone to decide whether a particular project, by itself or as part of a
more comprehensive scheme, will have such a beneficial effect on the arteries of interstate
commerce as to warrant it. That determination is legislative in character.
In section eight of the Reclamation Act of I9o2,74 based on the property clause,75
which vests in Congress the authority to control the use of federal public lands, how-
72 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §8, c. 3-
73 3 PRESIDENT'S WATER REsotmcEs Poucit CoMM'N, REPORT 23 (1950).
732 STAT. 390 (1902), 43 U.S.C. §383 (1952).
" U.S. CoNSr. art. IV, §3, c. 2.
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ever, the Secretary of the Interior is directed to proceed, in carrying out the terms of
that act, in conformity with state laws relating to the control, appropriation, use, or
distribution of water used in irrigation. There is now a vigorous movement to have
Congress apply that same principle to all federal agencies in dealing with water where
rights of use may be affected.
Let us assume, second, that the state will develop the river basin, as California
proposes to do with respect to the Feather River.
In such instances, the state files on the unappropriated water in the basin, stores
the water and conveys it to the places of use, and delivers it to consumers through the
media of organizations. The state is the formal appropriator, as is the Bureau of
Reclamation with respect to federal reclamation projects, and the state contracts with
intermediate organizations for delivery to the water users; but some courts say
that these users are the actual appropriators, even though title to the right is held by
the agency that makes the formal appropriation.76
Planning and development in river basins, however, will probably be carried out
by combined efforts. The Advisory Committee on Water Resources Policy suggests
that to achieve the maximum beneficial use of water resources, planning for their use
must be participated in by the interested federal agencies, the states, local governments,
and private citizens. 77  Full development will require the resources and powers of
both state and federal governments.
Under our system of constitutional government, it is fundamental that rights
of private property must be respected. Persons may not be deprived of their property
without due process of law, nor may private property be taken for public use without
just compensation. But by exercising the power of eminent domain, a governmental
or public agency, when adequately empowered and financed, may take established
rights of property-in this case, water rights-and may reshuffle the water and its
uses and users through the medium of contractual relationships.
B. What Are the Existing Water Rights Doctrines in the River Basin?
In all states in which planned river basin development will take place, some form
or forms of water rights doctrine already exist. In the West, this may be solely the
appropriation doctrine for surface streams, or it may be appropriation and riparian
combined; for percolating ground water, it may be appropriation, or it may be some
principle that rests on ownership of overlying land. In the east, this will generally
be the riparian doctrine as to surface water, and either the doctrine of absolute owner-
ship or that of reasonable use with respect to percolating ground water.
" Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 93-95 (937); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 612-15 (1945);
Murphy v. Kerr, 296 Fed. 536, 544-45 (D. N. M. 1923), afl'd, 5 F.2d 9o8 (8th Cir. 1925); Prosolc v.
Steamboat Canal Co., 37 Nev. 154, 159, x62-65, r40 Pac. 720, 144 Pac. 744 (1914); Whiting v. Lyman
Water Co., 59 Ariz. 121, 124, 124 P.2d 316 (1942). Contra, Farmers' Cooperative Ditch Co. v. Riverside
Irr. Dist., 14 Idaho 450, 457-59, 94 Pac. 76x (x9o8); In re Walla Walla River, 141 Ore. 492, 496-98,
16 P.2d 939 (1932). Neither the ditch company alone nor the users alone are appropriators in the strict
sense of that term. Jefferson County v. Rocky Mountain Water Co., 102 Cobo. 351, 356, 79 P.2d 373
(1938). See discussion in 2 WIEL, op. Cit. supra note 5, §§1338-47.
" PRESIDENTIAL ADIVSORY COMM. ON WATER RESOURCES POLICY, op. cit. supIra note i, at 14.
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In jurisdictions in which the riparian doctrine is firmly established, there may
be a question of superimposing some form of the appropriative principle on the
underlying riparian system, because the riparian doctrine, in its original common-
law form, is not alone adequate for river basin development in any area in which
the available water supply falls short of the quantity needed for all demanded uses.
In these jurisdictions, the riparian right probably is not lost by mere failure to exercise
it, so that an unused right may be put to use at any time in the future, regardless of
demands of appropriators. This presents a serious problem; but if, in a given state,
the court decisions with respect to the vesting of riparian rights are few and of little
practical effect, the changeover to a predominantly appropriative system might be less
difficult.
In states in which the riparian doctrine has been repudiated and rights to the
use of water may be obtained only by appropriation, riparian problems are a thing of
the past-if they ever existed-and a major problem is and will be to use the appropri-
ative principle to its best advantage and to make needed modifications to conform to
large area development.
Where the riparian and appropriation doctrines exist concurrently, their ad-
justment necessarily poses substantial problems. This is the case in the two largest
states, where adjustments between these basic doctrines have been made, are being
made, and doubtless will continue to be made.
C. Water Rights Doctrines in Relation to Continuing Large-Scale Development
The trend in both the West and the East is toward large-scale development of sur-
face water supplies. In many areas, the smaller opportunities are largely exhausted,
and group organizations and public agencies have been and are being more and more
employed for the purpose of storing water and conveying it considerable distances to
the places of use. An extreme example: The Feather River Project in California
proposes to take water from the northern Sierra Nevada and convey it almost to
the Mexican border-a distance of hundreds of miles, down the Sacramento Valley,
up the San Joaquin Valley, over a mountain range, and thence into southern Cali-
fornia. The principal water rights problem there is created by the "areas of origin"
statute which requires that areas in which water originates shall not be deprived of
the full quantity they need by reason of any state or federal project.P The State
Department of Water Resources is directed to file on all unappropriated water needed
for state projects. When the "areas of origin" question is settled-by some arrange-
ment that will safeguard not only the valid claims of areas of origin, but also the
equities of areas to which the excess water is exported-a major problem in such
projects will be that of dealing with users of water on the basis of contractual relation-
ships, rather than individual water rights.
In Nebraska, too, an issue arose as to whether the state should permit the
"'See CAL. WATER CODE ANN. §§10500, 10504, 10505 (West 1956) (water supplies of counties of
origin); id. §§x1128, I140o, 15451, 11452, I146o, 11461, 11462, 11463, 11500 (water supplies of water-
sheds or areas of origin).
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diversion and use of stored water to irrigate lands outside the basin from which
the water was originally taken when the Central Nebraska Public Power and Irriga-
tion District proposed to take some 6oo,ooo acre-feet of water annually from the
Platte River and use about sixty per cent of it outside the Platte River basin in the
Republican River basin. The Department of Roads and Irrigation granted the
necessary water allotments, but this action was appealed by both appropriators and
riparians in the Platte Valley. After reviewing the legislative history and the impact
on the economy of the Platte Valley, the Nebraska Supreme Court overruled the De-
partment of Roads and Irrigation and declared the applications of the District to be
revoked. 9 Several bills have since been introduced in the state legislature to au-
thorize transwatershed diversion, but none has passed, and the laws of Nebraska,
as interpreted by the state supreme court, now forbid transwatershed diversion.
80
This provision has direct impact on river basin development. Not only did the
Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District have to confine its water use
development activities to the Platte River basin, but other proposed transwatershed
diversions, as proposed by the Bureau of Reclamation, could not be undertaken. River
basin development plans have, accordingly, been redirected toward the utilization
of water resources within the watershed of origin.
Several other problem situations also arise in connection with large-scale develop-
ment under the riparian system. The most commonly discussed is that faced by
a group enterprise in developing a water supply for irrigation when it is economically
desirable to store water and use it on lands not contiguous to the stream. Similarly,
under the riparian doctrine, particularly as to nonnavigable watercourses, a city often
does not have authority, solely as riparian owner, to transport water great distances
for its use. It may, however, acquire needed rights through such measures as pur-
chase, condemnation, and prescription. And in another situation, large-scale develop-
ment by state, or more often by federal, agencies results in the almost complete elim-
ination of private riparian rights. This is true where reservoirs are built to develop
fully the power potential of a stream. Lands are purchased or condemned for reser-
voir purposes, and access to the reservoir is by permission of the developing agency.
Between the lowest dam and the backwater of the highest reservoir, the river may be
completely controlled, and, unless specifically reserved, riparian rights are acquired
by the agency. In case of navigable streams, it has been held that the federal govern-
ment holds a navigation easement and does not need to pay for riparian water rights
where the development is for navigational purposes sl Any use of water from the
9 Osterman v. Central Nebraska Public Power & Irr. Dist., 131 Neb. 356, 268 N.W. 334 (1936). NrX.
REv. STAT. §46-2o6 (1943) provides that water diverted from a stream shall not be turned into any
other stream unless the former exceeds xoo feet in width, in which case not more than 75 per cent of the
regular flow shall be taken. Sec. 46-265 provides that unused water shall be returned to the stream from
which taken, or to the Missouri River. These sections, said the supreme court in the Osterman case,
as a practical matter, necessarily limit the location of canals to places within the watershed of the stream
that is the source of water supply.
soNrnuRAsxA LEGIsLATrvE COUNCIL, SuBcoMMITTrE ON WATER DivisION, FINAL REPORT 25 (1944).
a' See 3 PRESIDENT'S VATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, op. cit. supra note 73, at 25-29.
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reseivoir must be under contract with the developing agency. With such complete
development, the end result of large-scale development under the riparian system is
apparently no different from the end result under the appropriation doctrine.
It seems inevitable that as these large-scale and basin-wide developments progress-
necessarily with the aid of public financing and with control by public agencies or
large group organizations-the water rights of new users will be represented less
and less by permits and certificates of appropriation issued by the state engineers,
and more and more by water service contracts with organizations charged with the
distribution of water to users-which organizations themselves may either have
appropriated the water, acquired all the riparian rights, or contracted for water
supplies from public agencies which are the formal appropriators.
D. Coordination of Surface and Ground Water Rights
An important feature of successful river basin development is the coordination of
all rights to the use of interconnected water supplies, both surface and subterranean.
If all rights of use are governed by the appropriation doctrine, correlation is made
on the basis of priority of appropriation. An example is Colorado, where rights that
pertain to a certain stream are subject to prior rights in ground waters that feed the
stream, and vice versa8 2
If part of the rights are riparian and part appropriative, however, as in California,
coordination includes adjustment of the two conflicting principles and correlation of
all rights on the basis of reasonable beneficial use. Coordination is legally possible in
cases in which there is some give-and-take, such as between rights of prior appropria-
tion and riparian rights that have been restricted to reasonable beneficial use against
appropriators. It is not legally possible in a case in which owners of lands overlying
percolating waters tributary to a surface stream are recognized by the courts as having
absolute ownership of the percolating water. In such a case, these landowners may
lawfully cut off the percolating water entirely for their own use before it gets out
of their lands and enters the stream. Nor is coordination possible where percolating
water in these lands, instead of being tributary to a stream, has escaped from it.
In that case, those who hold rights in the stream may, in the exercise of such rights,
cut off the escaping supply completely without recourse on the part of the overlying
owners, no matter how long the latter may have been using the ground water.
By hydrologic processes, the percolating water enters and leaves the substrata of the
overlying owner. While the water is in his land, where this doctrine prevails, he
has an absolute right to use it; before entering his land, or after leaving it, no right
at all.
E. Interstate Matters
River basins do not respect state lines. A number of cases have arisen and have
been decided with respect to rights to the use of water of interstate streams. In some
82 Black v. Taylor, 128 Colo. 449, 458-59, 264 P. 2d 502 (1953); Nevius v. Smith, 86 Colo. 178, 181-
83, 279 Pac. 44 (929); Faden v. Hubbell, 93 Colo. 358, 368-69, 28 P. 2d 247 (1933); Safranek v.
Limon, 123 Colo. 330, 334-35, 228 P. 2d 975 (95.)
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such cases, private parties only have been involved; most of these have been litigated
in federal courts. Others have risen to the dignity of interstate suits, brought and
decided in the United States Supreme Court, which has original jurisdiction of liti-
gated controversies between states.
The United States Supreme Court has laid down broad principles that must
govern its decisions in such casesP3 Each state across which, or along the borders of
which, an interstate stream flows is entitled to an equitable apportionment of the
benefits of the stream. There is no set formula for making such an apportionment.
Of those cases that have been litigated in the West, no two are alike. The Supreme
Court takes the view that a contest between states is to be settled "in the large and
ample way that alone becomes the dignity of the litigants concerned."84 The wide
range of physical and legal conditions and combinations of conditions in interstate
river basins is reflected in the diverse ways in which the Supreme Court has handled
this broad principle of equitable apportionment of benefits between statesp5
In addition to litigation in the Supreme Court, apportionments of waters of various
interstate streams have been made by compact, with the consent of CongressP0 The
Supreme Court has recommended that this, rather than resort to the Court, be the
medium of settlement, 7 and it has held that whether an apportionment be made
by compact or by decree of the Court, it is binding on the citizens of each state and
on all water claimants.88
There are some state statutes with respect to the appropriation of water within one
state for use in another. A few states make it difficult or impossible to divert water
legally within their boundaries for conveyance across the state line for use in an ad-
joining state. Others have what are called reciprocal statutes-they permit such ap-
propriations to be made, provided the sister state enacts similar legislation8 9
F. Resource Management Districts
As the demand for water increases and we apply more conservation measures on
our land, more management and water-control measures on our watersheds, and
more dams and channel-control structures on our rivers, we will reach a point at
which all sizable streams and rivers will be more or less regulated and managed, and
the concept of "natural flow" will have little meaning. Water supplies will be man-
83 See 3 PRESIDENT'S VATER RESOURCES POLICY COMNI'N, Op. cit. stepra note 73, at 58.
"Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 557, 529 (1936).
" Cf. Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U.S. 46, 95-I14," 117 (9o7); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419,
464-71, 488-89, 496 (1922); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 66o, 669-74 (1931); New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342-48 (193); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 522-30 (1936); Hinder-
lider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 1o-Is (1938); Colorado v. Kansas, 320
U.S. 383, 391-400 (1943); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 617-27, 631-46 (i945).
" See 3 PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMM'N, Op'. cit. supra note 73, at 64.
See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943).
ES Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, io6 (1938).
ES See HUTCHINS, op. cit. supra note 5, at 403-07; NAT'L RESOURCES PLANNING BOARD, Op. eit.
rupra note 19, at 1g-2i; HUTCHINS, Op. cit. supra note 46, at 364-67; WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE NEVADA
Lw oF 'WATER RIGHTS 51-54 (1955), THE NEw MExIco LAw OF WArT RIGHTS 38-42 (1955); THE
IDAHO LAw oF WATER RIGHTS 83-85 (1956).
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aged, and the participation of water users in water-management decisions will become
extremely important. This prospect suggests the need for strong, locally-controlled
resource-management districts which might carry out the local phases of river basin
development usually under agreement with the developing agency. Since "rights" to
use will be directly affected by management of water supplies, the direct administra-
tion of individual water rights by a state agency will become complicated and difficult.
In such situations, the state may find it desirable to call upon local public districts
for assistance in administering the individual water rights concerned, so that ad-




It is apparent that much of the water rights doctrine of this nation was designed
to cope with problems that arose from individual efforts to develop and use natural
water supplies. Because of both physical and economic factors, however, it has be-
come increasingly clear that individual enterprise in this field must be more effectively
supplemented by group and public efforts. In the light of these changing conditions,
a reappraisal of the effectiveness of existing water law doctrines is in order.
The several doctrines that govern rights to the use of water, some of which have
been centuries in the making, are based on either landownership or prior appropria-
tion. The former group comprises the riparian doctrine with respect to watercourses,
and the English, American, and correlative doctrines with respect to percolating
ground waters-all of which accord rights to the use of water to certain land solely
because of the land's contiguity to the source of water supply. Under the appropria-
tion doctrine, on the other hand, water rights that pertain either to watercourses or
to percolating ground waters are acquired by those who first divert the water and
put it to beneficial use. In some states in which opposing systems-such as riparian
and appropriation-are recognized, adjustment of conflicts has occupied the attention
of courts and legislatures for many decades, and important problems still await solu-
tion. Each of the doctrines has certain advantages and disadvantages, depending on
the point of view adopted-for the interest of the individual water user and that of
the public at large are not always identical.
As consumptive use of water has increased, extant water law doctrines have been
reexamined. In some western states, landownership doctrines-both riparian and
ground water-have been eliminated in favor of exclusive appropriation systems; in
others, these doctrines have been or are being modified to mitigate or remove their
obstructive aspects. There is a movement in some of the riparian eastern states, too,
toward certain aspects of the appropriation doctrine. For, riparian and other land-
ownership principles are not well-suited to comprehensive river basin development,
since the water rights must be acquired and merged with other rights involved. The
appropriative principle, instead, would seem to be preferable, although it is not per-
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fect, and much serious thought is being devoted to measures that will improve it for
this purpose.
While the trend in both the West and the East toward more management and
development of watersheds, rivers, and ground water has accelerated the adjustment
of water rights doctrines, shifts in the use of water accompanying our expanding
economy may also require adjustments, with due regard, of course, to constitutional
requirements of due process wherever vested rights are involved. And in this con-
nection, it seems inevitable that the interests of individual water users will come to
be represented less and less by individual water rights acquired from the state and
more and more by contracts with resource-management districts which will hold mass
water rights in trust for the users.
As we look to the future, new technologies may increase water supplies through
such innovations as increasing rain and desalting sea water, and these techniques may
result in a great change in the economics of water use. In framing a model water
code, one that will implement optimal river basin development, all of these possi-
bilities-and, indeed, many others-must be considered.
